- /*
- * @(#)RuntimePermission.java 1.53 04/04/20
- *
- * Copyright 2004 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * SUN PROPRIETARY/CONFIDENTIAL. Use is subject to license terms.
- */
-
- package java.lang;
-
- import java.security.*;
- import java.util.Enumeration;
- import java.util.Hashtable;
- import java.util.StringTokenizer;
-
- /**
- * This class is for runtime permissions. A RuntimePermission
- * contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but
- * no actions list; you either have the named permission
- * or you don't.
- *
- * <P>
- * The target name is the name of the runtime permission (see below). The
- * naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention.
- * Also, an asterisk
- * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to
- * signify a wildcard match. For example: "loadLibrary.*" or "*" is valid,
- * "*loadLibrary" or "a*b" is not valid.
- * <P>
- * The following table lists all the possible RuntimePermission target names,
- * and for each provides a description of what the permission allows
- * and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
- * <P>
- *
- * <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="permission target name,
- * what the target allows,and associated risks">
- * <tr>
- * <th>Permission Target Name</th>
- * <th>What the Permission Allows</th>
- * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>createClassLoader</td>
- * <td>Creation of a class loader</td>
- * <td>This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant.
- * Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class
- * loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system.
- * These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection
- * domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the
- * classes the permissions for that domain.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>getClassLoader</td>
- * <td>Retrieval of a class loader (e.g., the class loader for the calling
- * class)</td>
- * <td>This would grant an attacker permission to get the
- * class loader for a particular class. This is dangerous because
- * having access to a class's class loader allows the attacker to
- * load other classes available to that class loader. The attacker
- * would typically otherwise not have access to those classes.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>setContextClassLoader</td>
- * <td>Setting of the context class loader used by a thread</td>
- * <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions
- * when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system
- * class loader. Granting setContextClassLoader permission would allow
- * code to change which context class loader is used
- * for a particular thread, including system threads.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>enableContextClassLoaderOverride</td>
- * <td>Subclass implementation of the thread context class loader methods</td>
- * <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions
- * when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system
- * class loader. Granting enableContextClassLoaderOverride permission would allow
- * a subclass of Thread to override the methods that are used
- * to get or set the context class loader for a particular thread.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>setSecurityManager</td>
- * <td>Setting of the security manager (possibly replacing an existing one)
- * </td>
- * <td>The security manager is a class that allows
- * applications to implement a security policy. Granting the setSecurityManager
- * permission would allow code to change which security manager is used by
- * installing a different, possibly less restrictive security manager,
- * thereby bypassing checks that would have been enforced by the original
- * security manager.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>createSecurityManager</td>
- * <td>Creation of a new security manager</td>
- * <td>This gives code access to protected, sensitive methods that may
- * disclose information about other classes or the execution stack.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>getenv.{variable name}</td>
- * <td>Reading of the value of the specified environment variable</td>
- * <td>This would allow code to read the value, or determine the
- * existence, of a particular environment variable. This is
- * dangerous if the variable contains confidential data.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>exitVM</td>
- * <td>Halting of the Java Virtual Machine</td>
- * <td>This allows an attacker to mount a denial-of-service attack
- * by automatically forcing the virtual machine to halt.
- * Note: The "exitVM" permission is automatically granted to all code
- * loaded from the application class path, thus enabling applications
- * to terminate themselves.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>shutdownHooks</td>
- * <td>Registration and cancellation of virtual-machine shutdown hooks</td>
- * <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious shutdown
- * hook that interferes with the clean shutdown of the virtual machine.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>setFactory</td>
- * <td>Setting of the socket factory used by ServerSocket or Socket,
- * or of the stream handler factory used by URL</td>
- * <td>This allows code to set the actual implementation
- * for the socket, server socket, stream handler, or RMI socket factory.
- * An attacker may set a faulty implementation which mangles the data
- * stream.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>setIO</td>
- * <td>Setting of System.out, System.in, and System.err</td>
- * <td>This allows changing the value of the standard system streams.
- * An attacker may change System.in to monitor and
- * steal user input, or may set System.err to a "null" OutputStream,
- * which would hide any error messages sent to System.err. </td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>modifyThread</td>
- * <td>Modification of threads, e.g., via calls to Thread
- * <tt>interrupt</tt>, <tt>stop</tt>, <tt>suspend</tt>,
- * <tt>resume</tt>, <tt>setDaemon</tt>, <tt>setPriority</tt>,
- * <tt>setName</tt> and <tt>setUncaughtExceptionHandler</tt>
- * methods</td>
- * <td>This allows an attacker to modify the behaviour of
- * any thread in the system.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>stopThread</td>
- * <td>Stopping of threads via calls to the Thread <code>stop</code>
- * method</td>
- * <td>This allows code to stop any thread in the system provided that it is
- * already granted permission to access that thread.
- * This poses as a threat, because that code may corrupt the system by
- * killing existing threads.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>modifyThreadGroup</td>
- * <td>modification of thread groups, e.g., via calls to ThreadGroup
- * <code>destroy</code>, <code>getParent</code>, <code>resume</code>,
- * <code>setDaemon</code>, <code>setMaxPriority</code>, <code>stop</code>,
- * and <code>suspend</code> methods</td>
- * <td>This allows an attacker to create thread groups and
- * set their run priority.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>getProtectionDomain</td>
- * <td>Retrieval of the ProtectionDomain for a class</td>
- * <td>This allows code to obtain policy information
- * for a particular code source. While obtaining policy information
- * does not compromise the security of the system, it does give
- * attackers additional information, such as local file names for
- * example, to better aim an attack.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>readFileDescriptor</td>
- * <td>Reading of file descriptors</td>
- * <td>This would allow code to read the particular file associated
- * with the file descriptor read. This is dangerous if the file
- * contains confidential data.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>writeFileDescriptor</td>
- * <td>Writing to file descriptors</td>
- * <td>This allows code to write to a particular file associated
- * with the descriptor. This is dangerous because it may allow
- * malicious code to plant viruses or at the very least, fill up
- * your entire disk.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>loadLibrary.{library name}</td>
- * <td>Dynamic linking of the specified library</td>
- * <td>It is dangerous to allow an applet permission to load native code
- * libraries, because the Java security architecture is not designed to and
- * does not prevent malicious behavior at the level of native code.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>accessClassInPackage.{package name}</td>
- * <td>Access to the specified package via a class loader's
- * <code>loadClass</code> method when that class loader calls
- * the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageAccess</code> method</td>
- * <td>This gives code access to classes in packages
- * to which it normally does not have access. Malicious code
- * may use these classes to help in its attempt to compromise
- * security in the system.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>defineClassInPackage.{package name}</td>
- * <td>Definition of classes in the specified package, via a class
- * loader's <code>defineClass</code> method when that class loader calls
- * the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageDefinition</code> method.</td>
- * <td>This grants code permission to define a class
- * in a particular package. This is dangerous because malicious
- * code with this permission may define rogue classes in
- * trusted packages like <code>java.security</code> or <code>java.lang</code>,
- * for example.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>accessDeclaredMembers</td>
- * <td>Access to the declared members of a class</td>
- * <td>This grants code permission to query a class for its public,
- * protected, default (package) access, and private fields and/or
- * methods. Although the code would have
- * access to the private and protected field and method names, it would not
- * have access to the private/protected field data and would not be able
- * to invoke any private methods. Nevertheless, malicious code
- * may use this information to better aim an attack.
- * Additionally, it may invoke any public methods and/or access public fields
- * in the class. This could be dangerous if
- * the code would normally not be able to invoke those methods and/or
- * access the fields because
- * it can't cast the object to the class/interface with those methods
- * and fields.
- </td>
- * </tr>
- * <tr>
- * <td>queuePrintJob</td>
- * <td>Initiation of a print job request</td>
- * <td>This could print sensitive information to a printer,
- * or simply waste paper.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>getStackTrace</td>
- * <td>Retrieval of the stack trace information of another thread.</td>
- * <td>This allows retrieval of the stack trace information of
- * another thread. This might allow malicious code to monitor the
- * execution of threads and discover vulnerabilities in applications.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler</td>
- * <td>Setting the default handler to be used when a thread
- * terminates abruptly due to an uncaught exception</td>
- * <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious
- * uncaught exception handler that could interfere with termination
- * of a thread</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>preferences</td>
- * <td>Represents the permission required to get access to the
- * java.util.prefs.Preferences implementations user or system root
- * which in turn allows retrieval or update operations within the
- * Preferences persistent backing store.) </td>
- * <td>This permission allows the user to read from or write to the
- * preferences backing store if the user running the code has
- * sufficient OS privileges to read/write to that backing store.
- * The actual backing store may reside within a traditional filesystem
- * directory or within a registry depending on the platform OS</td>
- * </tr>
-
- * </table>
- *
- * @see java.security.BasicPermission
- * @see java.security.Permission
- * @see java.security.Permissions
- * @see java.security.PermissionCollection
- * @see java.lang.SecurityManager
- *
- * @version 1.53 04/04/20
- *
- * @author Marianne Mueller
- * @author Roland Schemers
- */
-
- public final class RuntimePermission extends BasicPermission {
-
- private static final long serialVersionUID = 7399184964622342223L;
-
- /**
- * Creates a new RuntimePermission with the specified name.
- * The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, such as
- * "exit", "setFactory", etc. An asterisk
- * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to
- * signify a wildcard match.
- *
- * @param name the name of the RuntimePermission.
- */
-
- public RuntimePermission(String name)
- {
- super(name);
- }
-
- /**
- * Creates a new RuntimePermission object with the specified name.
- * The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, and the
- * actions String is currently unused and should be null.
- *
- * @param name the name of the RuntimePermission.
- * @param actions should be null.
- */
-
- public RuntimePermission(String name, String actions)
- {
- super(name, actions);
- }
- }